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THE NINTH AMENDMENT: A SURVEY OF
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS SINCE GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT
By LYMAN RHOADES,* RODNEY R. PATULA**
[T] he bills of rights in the American constitutions have not
been drafted for the introduction of new law but to secure old
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INTRODUCTION
T HE ninth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of cer-
tain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." For nearly two centuries this lan-
guage was cited for little more than the general principles of
federalism and limited constitutional government." Indeed, the
ninth amendment was uniformly read in conjunction with the
tenth as a rule of construction limiting the power of the federal
government3 No substantive unenumerated rights under the
ninth were articulated by the Court. Mr. Justice Jackson, in
1955, characterized his understanding of the amendment:
What are those other rights "retained by the people?" . . . [T~he
ninth amendment rights which are not to be disturbed by the
federal government are still a mystery to me.4
Since 1965, however, new attention has been given the ninth
amendment. In that year, the Supreme Court delivered its now
famous decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, marking the first
instance of the ninth amendment's use in finding an unenumer-
ated, substantive right- the right of privacy in the marital
relationship. The issues resolved and those left unanswered by
Griswold's application of the amendment have been the subject
of much judicial and academic argument.
In Griswold the appellants were convicted in state court of
advising married people in the use of contraceptives. The Court
reversed the Connecticut convictions and struck down the stat-
ute in a 7-2 decision, embodying six separate opinions.
The decision is typically cited for the establishment of a
right to privacy in the marital relationship. Of interest to stu-
dents of the ninth amendment, however, Griswold also stands as
a promise, as yet unfulfilled, of substantive meaning for the
" See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947):
[W]hen objection is made that the exercise of a federal power
infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted power
under which the action of the Union was taken. if granted
power is found, necessarily the objection of invasicn of those
rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must
fail.
Id. at 96. See also Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right
to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 979; Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of
the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 814 (1966); Van Loan, Natural
Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1968).
See Moore, Ninth Amendment: Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEw ENG-
LAND L. REV. 215 (1972).
4 R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COUIT AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Gov-
ERNMENT 74-75 (1955).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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amendment. The right of marital privacy is arguably the first
unenumerated, substantive right recognized, at least in part,
under the ninth amendment, and it is conceivable that more
such rights could be "discovered." This article explores the
promise of Griswold and the subsequent federal decisions which
address the ninth amendment.' Beginning with three basic
formulations of the amendment set forth in Griswold, and trac-
ing these formulations through subsequent case law, the au-
thors offer a synthesis of ninth amendment doctrine-a syn-
thesis describing not only the current status of such doctrine,
but also one suggesting future uses of the amendment.
I. FROM Griswold: THREE VIEWS OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT
Of the six opinions in Griswold, there are three distinct
views of the ninth amendment. These include (1) Douglas'
majority opinion, (2) the Goldberg concurrence, and (3) the
two dissents authored by Justices Stewart and Black. Neither
the Harlan nor the White opinions addressed the ninth amend-
ment.
A. The Douglas Position
The majority opinion in Griswold, written by Justice
Douglas, has been widely hailed as the source of the so-called
penumbral theory of marital privacy. Douglas reasons that the
right of marital privacy is the product of "penumbras, formed
by emanations" of those guarantees in the first, third, fourth,
fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments -penumbras that pro-
vide the "life and substance" of the enumerated rights guar-
anteed by each of these amendments." This penumbral theory
suggests to Douglas the existence of a constitutional "zone of
privacy"" which cannot be invaded by the state.
It is unfortunate that Douglas does not explicitly describe
the precise manner in which he uses the ninth amendment. In
listing the amendments whose emanations create this zone of
privacy, Douglas articulates substantive rights for each amend-
ment except the ninth. He simply cites the ninth in full,'0 leav-
ing his intended use of the amendment in doubt. This leads one
to question whether marital privacy is a substantive right,
"The restriction of this article to federal cases is not to suggest that fed-
eral decisions are necessarily representative of all decisions which men-
tion the ninth amendment.






unenumerated by the Bill of Rights, and found in the ninth
amendment, or is it in fact a penumbral product of all the
amendments mentioned. Phrased differently, is the ninth amend-
ment, as used by Douglas, an actual source of a substantive
right, or is it an enabling amendment when used in conj unction
with other constitutional amendments?
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, remarks, "... I can find
no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any
other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before de-
cided by this Court."11 Stewart attacks the majority opinion
for using the ninth amendment as a source of the unenumerated
right of privacy. Even treating the ninth as an "enabler," how-
ever, suggests that the amendment is a necessary vehicle by
which Douglas fashions a substantive right from the enumer-
ated rights found in the other cited amendments.
We are thus left with two possible interpretations of the
Douglas position. Either the ninth amendment is the source
of a substantive right of marital privacy, or else the ninth is
an enabling clause, requiring the Court to construe the Con-
stitution as liberally as a spirited reading of the Bill of Rights
demands. Under either of these interpretations, the ninth is an
essential force in the recognition of rights not enumerated in
the Constitution.
B. The Goldberg Position
Justice Goldberg's concurrence relied heavily on the ninth
amendment. After tracing the historical development of the
amendment, 12 the opinion sets out a series of disclaimers, ex-
pressing the manner in which the ninth was not to be used.
It is not, Goldberg asserts, to be incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment for use against the states; nor is it to be
used as an independent source of rights:
Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitu-
tion's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not ex-
pressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent
that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive.1 3
Later, Goldberg hedges his disclaimers that the ninth
should not be read through the fourteenth:
In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to
the view that the "liberty" protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal Govern-
11 Id. at 530.
12 Id. at 487-91. An extensive history of the ninth amendment is developed
in Van Loan, supra note 2.
13 381 U.S. at 492.
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ment or the States is not restricted to rights specifically men-
tioned in the first eight amendments.'
4
I believe that the right of privacy in the marital relation
is fundamental and basic-a personal right "retained by the
people" within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Con-
necticut cannot constituticnally abridge his fundamental right,
which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from in-
fringement by the States.5
n
Goldberg, then, seems to affirm and deny at once a "fun-
damental rights" argument for the ninth amendment. While
there are no rights of substance therein, the amendment some-
how is further evidence of a general concept of "liberty" as
expressed in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.'
"
An outstanding feature of the Goldberg position, and
the one which most clearly distinguishes it from the Douglas
position, is Goldberg's use of the term "liberty." Goldberg
argues that "the concept of liberty protects those personal
rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific
terms of the Bill of Rights.' 7 To rule otherwise "is to ignore
the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever."
1 8
Thus, Goldberg treats the ninth, like the fifth and fourteenth,
as an amendment embodying a concept of liberty basic to the
Constitution. To Goldberg, the ninth precludes the Court from
denying a right implicit to liberty simply because the right
may not be enumerated in the Constitution. A failure to rec-
ognize a right of marital privacy would constitute a denial of
constitutional liberty, and therefore the right must be guar-
anteed.
An eternal concern of constitutional theorists is the means
by which rights, once recognized as constitutional in stature,
may be appropriately circumscribed. For Justice Black, rights
only existed to the extent they were specified in the language
of the Constitution. Consequently, an unenumerated right was
not a constitutional right at all. But for Goldberg, a right might
be unenumerated and still be of a constitutional quality, so long
as it was essential to the concept of liberty. Goldberg was at
least aware of the obvious problem of limiting rights by a prin-
ciple as broad as liberty:
14 Id. at 493.
1-,Id. at 499.
";Though both Justice Goldberg and Chief Justice Warren, who joined
Justice Goldberg in this opinion, have since left the Court, this con-
currence retains its precedential importance, since nearly half the
Griswold majority took part in it, and because Justice Brennan, who
also joined in the opinion, remains on the Court.
17 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added).
I., Id. at 491.
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I do not see how [the ninth amendment applied in this manner]
broadens the authority of the Court, rather it serves to support
what this Court has been doing in protecting fundamental
rights.'9
In contrast, Douglas viewed the marital privacy right as
either (1) a product of the various amendments discussed
earlier, with the ninth as an enabling vehicle, or (2) founded
upon the ninth amendment itself with the other amendments
serving as evidence of the framers' intent to protect certain
"penumbral" interests of the individual. Whether either inter-
pretation of Douglas' position offered sounder principles for
limiting recognition of unenumerated rights than did Gold-
berg's "liberty theory" was a question which denied a precise
answer in 1965. But as this article suggests, a much clearer
answer is now possible. A survey of subsequent federal case
law makes one fact certain: it is the belief in the potential or
the fear of lack of potential for circumscribing unenumerated
rights that has substantially controlled the lower courts' ac-
ceptance of the Douglas or Goldberg positions.
C. The Dissents
Justice Stewart's dissent goes to the heart of the Griswold
controversy over ninth amendment use:
[T]o say that the Ninth Amendment has anything to do with
this case is to turn somersaults with history. The Ninth Amend-
ment like its companion, the Tenth ... was . . . simply to
make clear that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not alter
the plan that the Federal Government was to be a government
of express and limited powers, and that all rights and powers not
delegated to it were retained by the people and the individual
States.
20
Essentially, the Stewart and Black dissents look to the long-
standing principles of limited government and federalism, shun-
ning the potential of both the Douglas and Goldberg positions.
Black's dissent adds still another dimension to the limited gov-
ernment and federalism arguments. He suggests that the ninth
amendment reasoning of Douglas and Goldberg are both really
due process formulations for a concept of "natural justice,"
21
and consequently he argues against the applicability of either:
[T]hey require judges to determine what is or is not constitu-
tional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are un-
wise or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is of
course that of a legislative body.2 2
11' Id. at 492-93.
2 Id. at 529-30 (emphasis added).
21 The concurrences of both Justices Harlan and White relied on due proc-
ess arguments to invalidate the Connecticut statute.
:2 381 U.S. at 511-12.
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The thrust of the Stewart and Black dissents is clear. They
would retain the established rule of applying the ninth (with
the tenth) only to limit federal incursions into state autonomy,
and reject any notion that the ninth amendment is a potential
source of substantive personal rights. To them it is manifest that
the "people" alluded to in the ninth exist only through the
legislatures of the states:
If, as I should surely hope, the law before us does not reflect the
standards of the people of Connecticut, the people of Connecticut
can freely exercise their true Ninth and Tenth Amendment
rights to persuade their elected representatives to repeal it.2 3
It is worthy of note that the dissents' "natural justice"
attack on the Douglas and Goldberg positions as well as their
own restrictive view of the ninth amendment constitute a re-
jection of the "substantive due process" nature of both the
penumbral and liberty approaches outlined earlier. When Jus-
tice Black expresses his unwillingness to rely upon judicial
"appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary," 24 he is
arguably reacting to the potential limitlessness of constitutional
rights produced by the Douglas and Goldberg formulations of
the amendment in Griswold.
II. THE POsT-Griswold RESPONSE
For the legal community today, Griswold remains as the
only "definitive" statement of the ninth amendment. The Su-
preme Court has largely refused to entertain ninth amend-
ment arguments inspired by Griswold; however, there are 15
Supreme Court and 154 lower federal court cases2 which dis-
cuss the amendment. These cases suggest two common themes.
First, certain Supreme Court Justices, most notably Douglas,
have modified and refined their positions with respect to the
ninth amendment.1' Second, the lower federal courts have
generally avoided a direct response to ninth amendment
claims. This is due, in part, to the absence of principles to
delimit recognition of unenumerated constitutional rights and,
in part, to a general confusion surrounding a "proper" inter-
pretation of Griswold. For the most part, those unenumerated
rights asserted have not been acknowledged under the aegis
of the ninth amendment. A few district courts, however, have
boldly reached into the language of the amendment to dis-
2. Id. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
-4 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
The 154 lower federal court cases include 42 in the circuit courts of
appeals and 112 in district courts, as of June 15, 1973.
See text pp. 170-72 infra.
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cover unprecedented and unenumerated rights.2 - But such a
creative use of the amendment has not spread to the higher
federal courts.
2 1
One district court opinion is illuminative of the problems
the federal courts face in understanding Griswold and the ninth
amendment. Judge Dumbauld, of the western district of Penn-
sylvania, called Griswold an "amusing case,"- explaining his
"understanding" in these terms:
[I]t might be argued that Negrich [an inmate in a Pennsyl-
vania prison] has a Ninth Amendment right to privacy, to be free
from unjustified intrusion by government . ... But it would
be unseemly for a court of first instance, absent further il-
lumination by lightnings from Olympus, to base its decisions
upon so "penumbral" or nebulous a dcctrine.1"'
In only two Supreme Court decisions since Griswold has a ninth
amendment claim been raised and addressed by the majority
opinion.3 1 In neither case did the Court provide the "lightnings
from Olympus" requested by Judge Dumbauld. The following
survey of post-Griswold decisions dramatically underscores the
need for such guidance.
A. Personal Rights
1. The Student Long Hair Cases
The asserted right of public school students to wear long
hair has been a prolific source of ninth amendment arguments.
Such claimed rights, based in whole or in part on the ninth,
have reached the federal courts in 26 cases since Griswold.
In two high court decisions, : 1 certiorari was denied stu-
dents seeking reinstatement in their schools after being sus-
•-7 See, e.g., Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972), where school
officials were enjoined from enforcing a rule excluding married high
school students from engaging in extracurricular activities on the
ground that the rule constituted an unwarranted invasion of the stu-
dents' penumbral right of privacy.
21 This is true with the pcssible exception of the circuit courts which have
found a right to personal choice in hair styles based, in part, upon the
ninth amendment. See text p. 161 infra.
2!, Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173, 178 (W.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 379 F.2d
213 (3d Cir. 1967).
246 F. Supp. at 179.
: Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972): "[T]he integrity of the fam-
ily unit has found protecticn in . . . the Ninth Amendment." 4majority
opinion citing Justice Goldberg's Griswold concurrence) (dictum); Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
160 (1971), where Justice Stewart for a 5-4 Court ruled that a New
York State Bar question asking affiants to applicant's character whether
they had visited the applicant's home was a violation of the first, fourth,
ninth, and fcurteenth amendments: "[lit borders on the frivolous .... "
See discussion in text at Section III infra, where these and other
Supreme Court cases since Griswold are discussed with reference to
individual justices' positions on the ninth amendment.
:;' Freeman v. Flake. 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent from denial
of certiorari); Olff v. East Side Union H.S. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissent from denial of certiorari).
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pended for hair code violations. In both cases, Justice Douglas
dissented from the denial of certiorari. In one opinion he rea-
soned that:
The word "liberty" is not defined in the Constitution. But as we
held in Griswold v. Connecticut . . . it includes at least the
fundamental rights "retained by the people" under the Ninth
Amendment .... One's hair style, like one's taste for food, or
one's liking for certain kinds of music, art, reading, recreation,
is certainly fundamental in our constitutional scheme .... .3
At the circuit court level, there have been only two deci-
sions where the ninth amendment was used successfully to
assert a right of free choice in grooming. In the first case,
Bishop v. Colaw,34 the eighth circuit used the ninth, in con-
junction with other amendments, to find such a right:
We hold that Stephen possessed a constitutionally protected
right to govern his personal appearance while attending public
high school . ... The source of this right has been found
within the Ninth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the privacy penumbra of the Bill
of Rights .... The common theme underlying decisions strik-
ing down hairstyle regulations is that the Constitution guaran-
tees rights other than those specifically enumerated, and that
the right to govern one's personal appearance is one of those
guaranteed rights.35
A year before Bishop was decided, the seventh circuit, in
Anderson v. Laird,36 denied first and ninth amendment claims
of a National Guard member seeking to wear his hair as he
wished. The court did observe, however, that "[i]f Anderson
were completely in civilian status, his position would have
legally persuasive stature."37 Finally recognizing the position
foreshadowed in Anderson, the seventh circuit permitted a right
to free choice in personal grooming in Arnold v. Carpenter.38
Here, as in Bishop, the ninth amendment was used with other
amendments to guarantee an unenumerated, substantive right.
The circuits denying ninth amendment claims in the long
hair cases are:
-The Third Circuit. "[I]n the absence of further guid-
ance from the Supreme Court, we ought not to expand the
Ninth Amendment beyond the notions applied to the right
of [marital] privacy as expressed in Griswold.
3 9
1 Olff v. East Side Union H.S. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1044 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissent from denial of certiorari).
:4 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
3.5 Id. at 1075.
3"; 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971).
:7 437 F.2d at 914.
:31 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
39 Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972).
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-The Fifth Circuit. "[A] regulation restricting the
length of hair restricts privacy not at all. Hair is, of
course, worn for all the world to see. We do not think
Griswold stands for any general 'right to go public as
one pleases.' ,,40
-The Sixth Circuit. "It is further contended that the
constitutional right of privacy of the students and their
parents has been impaired in violation of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We find
the contention to be without merit. . . . In our opinion
Griswold v. Connecticut has no application here.
'41
-The Tenth Circuit in Freeman v. Flake "4 2 did not an-
swer the student's ninth amendment claim directly but said,
in distinguishing Griswold, that hair style regulations do
not control conduct found in the privacy of the home.
In the ten district court cases where a ninth amendment
claim has been raised in support of a student's right to wear his
hair as he pleases, and in which the decision was not appealed,
the split of authority is even. Three districts have found a ninth
amendment right,4 3 three have denied such a right,44 and four
districts have not reached the ninth amendment arguments.
4 5
In all the district court decisions where the right to freedom
in personal grooming was successfully asserted, the court cited
a number of constitutional provisions. However, two holdings
are rather explicit in their use of the ninth amendment. First,
the district court for Idaho ruled:
Certain personal liberties, however, are established for every
individual by the reservation of rights contained in the Ninth
Amendment and by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This court concludes and holds that personal ap-
pearance, including hair length, is cne of these personal liberties,
subject only to reasonable regulation by the state in matters of
a legitimate state interest.
4
6
Second, the eastern district court for Texas reasoned:
[T]he fundamental right to be let alone, so often referred to in
"' Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 614 (5th Cir. 1972).
H Jackson v. Dcrrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850
(1970).
12 448 F.2d 258, 261 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972).
13 See Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616 (D. Idaho 1971); Parker v. Fry,
323 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Reichenberg v. NelsGn, 310 F. Supp.
248 (D. Neb. 1970).
14 See Bouse v. Hipes, 319 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Pritchard v.
Spring Branch Ind. School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex. 1970);
Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
'5 See Co'sey v. Seamans, 344 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Farmer
v. Catmull, 339 F. Supp. 70 (D. Utah 1972); Alberda v. Noeli, 322 F.
Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Martin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318 (W.D.
Pa. 1971).
Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616, 618 (D. Idaho 1971).
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Fourth Amendment settings, lies within the penumbra of that
constitutional guarantee, and should be classified as one of the
basic rights retained by the people through the Ninth Amend-
ment.
4 7
Given the split in the circuit courts and the indecision at
the district court level, one might expect - with Justice
Douglas -that the right of public school students to groom
as they please should be the major test area for ninth amend-
ment doctrine. Since the Supreme Court persists, however, in its
denials of certiorari in these cases, the lower courts are left
to deal with Griswold and the ninth amendment without
meaningful guidance.
2. The Rights of Public School Teachers
Dismissals of public school teachers have produced several
ninth amendment claims. In Fisher v. Snyder,48 the District
Court for Nebraska had an excellent opportunity to employ
the amendment. Here, an unmarried teacher was dismissed by
school authorities because men had reportedly spent the night
in her home. The court ordered her reinstated after ruling that
she possessed a consitutionally protected right of privacy. The
decision was based, in part, on Griswold, but the teacher's
ninth amendment claim was not reached.
In other cases of dismissal, a teacher who taught personal
political Leliefs in an economics course was not reinstated,
the court finding no first, fifth, or ninth amendment "rights of
academic freedom."'" Similarily, a loyality oath for teachers
was found not to violate a dismissed teacher's first, fifth, ninth,
or fourteenth amendment rights.'"' Ninth amendment pleas
went unanswered in a case challenging a dismissal allegedly
based on racial discrimination,- as well as a case of dismissal
for possession of marijuana.,
2
3. Demonstrations and Protests
Most demonstration and protest situations fall more clearly
under the ambit of first amendment freedoms than under ninth
amendment unenumerated rights. Indeed, where the ninth has
been raised to support acts of protest, it has been tied closely
to first amendment arguments. Since Griswold, there have been
eight federal court cases in which the ninth amendment has
•17 Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394, 402 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
4s 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972).
A9 Ahren v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972).
Knight %v. Board of Regents. 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 390
U.S. 36 (1968).
Caldwell v. Craighead. 423 F.2d 613 (6th Ci. 1970).
52 Lai v. Board of Trustees. 330 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
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been asserted to protect demonstrators.i : In none of these cases
has the ninth been used successfully. In fact, the only case
which affirmatively applies a Griswold-ninth amendment ration-
ale does so to suppress a demonstration. In People v. Doorley,5 4
the District Court for Rhode Island denied protestors the right
to picket in a residential neighborhood on the ground that
the pickets invaded the residents' rights of privacy.
Even in those cases where the protestors' convictions were
reversed by a federal court, the decisions turned on constitu-
tional provisions other than the ninth amendment, most fre-
quently on the strength of first amendment rationales. ,5
4. Obscenity and Pornography
At the district court level, two ninth amendment challenges
to federal laws prohibiting interstate transportation of obscene
materials have been successful. In the first of these, United
States v. B & H Distributing Corp.,5 ' the court found that ban-
ning interstate transportation of obscene materials where
neither unwilling adults nor children would be exposed to them
is "unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First and
Ninth Amendments." 57 In the second case, United States v.
Orito,5 a claimed ninth amendment right to transport obscene
materials was not reached, but the court cited Griswold, saying:
"[w]ith the right to read obscene matters comes the right to
transport or to receive such material when done in a fashion
that does not pander it or impose it upon unwilling adults or
upon minors."59
Other cases dealing with transportation or possession of
obscene materials have either rejected the ninth amendment
claims of petitioners or have decided the issues on first amend-
ment grounds.'"' Where the ninth amendment has been raised
53 Bright v. Nunn, 448 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1971); Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d
947 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo.
1970), modified, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971); Benson v. City of Min-
neapolis, 286 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1968); Brooks v. Briley, 274 F.
Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968); Schumann v.
New York, 270 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Carmichael v. Ailen, 267
F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967); United States v. Miller, 249 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), rehearing denied, 392 U.S. 917 (1968).
54 338 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (Ist Cir.
1972).
55 See, e.g., Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
56 319 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 927 (1971) (appeal
pending).
57 3.19 F. Supp. at 1237.
58 338 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1970), prob. juris. noted. 404 U.S. 819 (1971).
.511 338 F. Supp. at 310.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Zacher, 332 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Simpson v. Spice, 318 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Wis. 1970); United States v.
Luros, 260 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Iowa 1966).
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in this area it has again been coupled with first amendment
freedom of speech arguments.
5. Landlord-Tenant Disputes
Recently, tenants have sought to use the ninth amendment
in disputes with their landlords. In each instance thus far,
the asserted ninth amendment rights have been raised to no
avail. In Velazquez v. Thompson,"0 tenants employed the
amendment to challenge New York's summary eviction statute
and their landlords' use of the statute in cases of nonpayment
of rent. The unenumerated right claimed by the tenants was a
right to "habitable housing," but the court found their argu-
ments to be without merit. Similarily, courts in two jurisdic-
tions have denied ninth amendment claims where tenants sought
to invalidate state statutes permitting landlords to seize and
sell the tenant's household effects in distraint for rent.
6 2
6. Criminal Procedure Applications
Inroads have been made in the area of substantive ninth
amendment rights of persons accused of crimes. In Hooper v.
Gooding,; evidence inadmissable at trial was admitted during a
preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing judge was re-
quested by defense counsel to exercise his discretionary power
to close the hearing and thereby protect his client's right of
privacy. The judge denied the motion and the district court
subsequently reversed the ruling:
Failure to exercise such discretion under appropriate circum-
stances might well constitute a violation of a defendant's right
to privacy, a violation of the Ninth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States .... 64
In United States v. Tarlowski, the court cited the ninth
amendment, in dictum, to uphold a general right of "liberty,"
finding that a defendant was entitled to the presence of wit-
,'451 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1971).
Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kerrigan v.
Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn.), aff'd. 450 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1971).
Thcre are a number of other applications of the ninth amendment which
might benefit the poor. In the area of welfare law, see Conner v.
Finch, 314 F. Supp. 364 (N.D, Ill. 1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 1003 (1971)
(ninth and tenth amendment "right to family life" asserted in challenge
of income exclusion provision of Social Security Act). The welfare
cases and a variety of miscellaneous cases raise ninth amendment
claims, but the courts resolved these controversies on grounds other
than constitutional ones. The authors have not classified these cases
with other examples where the ninth amendment was not reached be-
because the former group of decisions rejected all constitutional argu-
ments. This classification of the cases is supported by several refer-
ences in case law. See. e.g.. Carliner v. Commissioner of the District ef
Columbia. 412 F.2d 1090 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969).
63 282 F. Supp. 624 (D. Ariz. 1968).
,'Id. at 627.
305 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
nesses at an Internal Revenue Service investigation of possible
tax evasion. The adverse ruling was, however, specifically
overturned on fifth amendment due process grounds.
In other cases, courts have rejected or ignored ninth amend-
ment claims to be free from prejudicial pretrial publicity," and
to be free from prosecutions conducted in bad faith. , In un-
equivocal terms, the court for the northern district of Illinois
denied a ninth amendment argument of freedom from giving
compelled testimony before a grand jury: "These conten-
tions are so patently frivolous . . . that they do not merit
discussion."6
7. Prisoner Rights Cases
Prisoner rights claims premised on the ninth amendment
have been raised in two circuit court and four district court
cases since 1965."" The decision most squarely addressing (and
rejecting) a ninth amendment claim, Burns v. Swenson 7 " denied
the prisoner's asserted right to be free from the maximum
security facility in the Missouri state penitentiary. The court
considered the ninth amendment in these terms:
[The prisoner] would have us ascribe Constitutional dimensions
to penal treatment which is substantially less revere than that
barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Griswold
does not dictate an adjudication that Burns' confinement in the
Maximum Security Unit deprived him of a constitutionally pro-
tected right. The Ninth Amendment claim has been accorded
due consideration. It is devoid of merit and must be rejected.71
Similarily, courts have denied ninth amendment claims of
prisoners:
-not to be moved to a correctional facility where
communication with his counsel would be more
difficult;
72
-to be free from assaults and homosexual attacks in
jail;
73
66 Martinez v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 343 F. Supp. 897 (D.P.R.
1972).
67 Turco v. Allen, 334 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1971).
"'In re Womack, 333 F. Supp. 479, 481 (N.D. Ill. 1971). aff 'd. 466 F.2d 555
(7th Cir. 1972).
IIIKish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Ch. 1971); Burns v.
Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied. 404 U.S. 1062 (1972):
Wells v. McGinnis, 344 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Daviz v. Lindsay,
321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono. 317 F.
Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970); Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa.
1965), aff'd, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967).
7"430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
71 430 F.2d at 778.
7 Wells v. McGinnis, 344 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
7:3 Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971).
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-to be moved from solitary confinement into the prison
population, as a "fundamental right of privacy and
freedom from gratuitous humiliation at the hands of
the state.
7 4
-to be free from the censorship of mail by prison
authorities.
7 5
In short, no ninth amendment inroads in federal courts have
been made by prisoners.
8. Sterilization Cases
In the area of sterilization there have been two attempts to
fashion unenumerated rights from the ninth amendment. Both
attempts failed. In Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital,
7 the
plaintiff sought to compel a city hospital to perform a tubal
ligation, on the grounds that the ninth amendment guaranteed
the unenumerated "right to choose whether or not to bear
children." The court dismissed the action without addressing
the ninth amendment. An identical result occurred in the
sterilization case of McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center.
77
9. Sex Education Cases
As in the area of sterilization, there are two federal cases
in which the ninth amendment has been raised in disputes
concerning sex education. And again, like the sterilization
cases, these sex education decisions have ignored the amend-
ment. In Unitarian Church West v. McConnell T8 parents and
the church asserted first and ninth amendment rights to teach
sex education in Sunday school. Their right to do so was up-
held, but on grounds strictly limited to first amendment
doctrine.
In Manfredonia v. Barry,79 the first, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments were raised in defense of a birth control lecturer
arrested for disseminating information in front of a 14-month-
old child. Here again, the ninth amendment was not addressed
by the court, and the decision, favorable to the lecturer, was
based on other grounds.
B. The Governmental Sphere
1. Claims of Government Employees
In all cases dealing with the involvement of federal em-
74 Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
75 Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
76 341 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Mass. 1972).
.7 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971).
78 337 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
7" 336 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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ployees (or employees of federally funded agencies) in the
political process, claims that the Hatch Act" violates ninth
amendment rights have not been upheld by the courts.8 ' In these
cases, the courts have recognized the ongoing right of Congress
to regulate the political conduct of federal employees, and con-
stitutional claims (usually a combination of first, fifth, ninth,
and tenth amendments) have met resistance.
In two cases, postal employees who had been fired for non-
political activities asserted ninth amendment violations of pri-
vacy. In White v. Bloomberg,82 the employee was reinstated,
but on first, and not ninth amendment grounds. In Mindel v.
United States Civil Service Commission,83 however, a postal em-
ployee who had been fired because he was living with a woman
to whom he was not married was ordered reinstated because
his dismissal "violates the right to privacy guaranteed by the
Ninth Amendment.
8 4
2. Induction into the Armed Services
All circuit and district courts passing on the question have
ruled against claimants asserting a ninth amendment right to
be free from conscription.8 5 Though most courts have dismissed
such claims without commenting on the ninth amendment, the
first circuit, in United States v. Diaz,8 6 did expand on the issue
somewhat:
Defendant's final contention is that the Selective Service Act
is an unconstitutional interference with his "right to life" guar-
anteed by the Ninth Amendment. Whatever may be said for
the historical and . . . social merit of defendant's contention, we
feel compelled to follow existing Court precedent upholding
the constitutionality of Congressional conscription.
8 7
Indeed, no hint of a ninth amendment inroad appears in this
805 U.S.C. §§ 7321-27 (1970).
81 Fishkin v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Cal.
1969), appeal dismyissed, 396 U.S. 278 (1970); Dingers v. Hampton, 305
F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1969); Democratic State Central Comm. v.
Andolesk, 249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md. 1966).
82 345 F. Supp. 133 (D. Md. 1972).
83 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
84 Id. at 488.
85 United States v. Murray, 452 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Sowul, 447 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d
300 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Farrell, 443 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Uhl, 436 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Diaz, 427 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Dcrris, 319 F.
Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); United States v. Cook,
311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Drifka v. Brainard, 294 F. Supp. 425
(W.D. Wash. 1968); Katz v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
86427 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1970).
87 Id. at 639.
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area. Two other specific claims of ninth amendment freedom
from induction have been raised and rejected-the unenu-
merated right to "life and liberty,""" and a "right to one's own
life.'8,
3. Rights of Military Personnel
Consistent with the lack of success of ninth amendment
claims in the induction cases, attempts by those already in mili-
tary service to assert unenumerated rights have also failed. A
common argument utilizes the amendment to challenge person-
nel reassignments to combat zones, but such arguments have
fallen on deaf ears."" In one case, Gutierrez v. Laird,"' a female
air force officer asserted a ninth amendment "right to bear
children" in contesting a nonpregnancy rule imposed upon
women officers. The court distinguished this case from Gris-
wold, noting that the government was not prohibiting these
women from having children; the rule merely required such
officers to choose between a career as an officer or one as a
mother.""
C. The Environment
One of the most interesting developments in the area of
ninth amendment doctrine has been the recent assertions of an
unenumerated right to a decent environment. However, to date
no court has recognized such a right. In Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,!" the plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the construction of a dam. They pointed to the fifth,
ninth, and fourteenth amendments as authority for a right to
"enjoy the beauty of God's creation, and to live in an environ-
ment that preserves the unquantified amenities of life. '94 In
rejecting this claim, the district court for Arkansas summarized
its attitude toward the ninth amendment:
The Ninth Amendment may well be as important in the develop-
ment of constitutional law during the remainder of this century
as the Fourteenth Amendment has been since the beginning of
the century. But the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have not
stated facts which would under the present state of the law
constitute a violation of their constitutional rights .... 9.5
. Katz v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
'United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
!I0 See. e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
91 346 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id. at 293.
!:;325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
1,1 Id. at 739.
'.5 Id. (emphasis added).
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A number of other ninth amendment environmental claims
have failed. These include:
-the protection from aircraft noise near Washington Na-
tional Airport. "Plaintiffs concede that this would be the
first court to sustain the contention that the Ninth Amend-
ment . protects persons from noise. This circuit has
declined the invitation to elevate to constitutional level
the concerns for protection of the environment."" '
-the protection of the historic environment. In Ely v.
Velde, '7 the court denied an injunction which would have
kept the state from constructing a penal facility in an area
of historic homes. The ninth was specifically disallowed as
a basis for protection of the historic environment.'8
- a ninth amendment assertion to protect aesthetic, conser-
vational, and recreational interests. The court in Pennsyl-
vania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett" expressly
denied this claim, as did the court in Tanner v. Armco Steel
Corp.'10 The latter decision held that "The Ninth Amend-
ment, through its 'penumbra' or otherwise, embodies no
legally assertable right to a healthful environment.""' 1
III. FEw LIGHTNINGS FROM OLYMPUS
It should be clear from the foregoing survey of federal
case law that the promise of Griswold has not, as yet, been
realized. Except for a handful of lower court decisions, neither
the Douglas nor the Goldberg positions has gained wide accept-
ance. No doubt, some of this reluctance to breathe life into the
ninth amendment is a product of the traditional conception of
the amendment as a limiter of federal power. The constraints
of this traditionalism are, however, greatly overshadowed by
another factor-a profound absence of clarification of the
meaning and limits of the Griswold holding. The "lightnings
from Olympus" requested by Judge Dumbauld have simply
not been forthcoming.
No Supreme Court decision since Griswold has utilized
the ninth amendment as a basis for a fundamental constitu-
tional right. Griswold stands for the proposition that marital
privacy is a constitutional, though unenumerated, right, but
beyond Griswold, and in cases closely analogous to it factually,
Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 1972).
321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va.), modified, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
9S 321 F. Supp. at 1094.
99 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971).
1411340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
101 Id. at 535.
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the Court has refused to discuss the ninth amendment. Eugene
Van Loan, in 1968, suggested that "it is perhaps best that
the Griswold case and its use of the ninth amendment be
placed in the 'same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good
for this day and train only.' ""-' At least Mr. Douglas among
the Justices, is unwilling to view the ninth amendment in so
limited a fashion. Although his position in Griswold was not
entirely clear, Douglas has since refined his theory of the ninth
amendment. In Palmer v. Thompson,"" the Court in a 5-4
decision upheld the right of Jackson, Mississippi to close rather
than to integrate its public swimming pools. The battle was
joined largely on fourteenth amendment equal protection
grounds, but Douglas, dissenting separately, chose the ninth
amendment to explain his position:
The "rights" retained by the people within the meaning of the
Ninth Amendment may be related to those "rights" which are
enumerated in the Constitution.
[F]reedcm from discrimination based on race, creed, or color
has become by reason of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments one of the "enumerated rights" under the
Ninth Amendment that may not be voted up or voted down.104
Like Griswold, Palmer v. Thompson offers both an asserted
fundamental freedom and a group of amendments which are,
together, the source of the fundamental freedom. Douglas is
arguing that "ninth amendment rights" are somehow related to
enumerated rights. The nature of this relation is the key to
understanding the refinement of the Douglas position:
We deal here with analogies to rights secured by the Bill of
Rights or by the Constitution itself .... [The right of races to
swim together] is in the penumbra of the policies of the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and as a matter
of constitutional policy should be in the category of those enu-
merated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment. If not in-
cluded, those rights become narrow legalistic concepts which
turn on the formalism of laws, not on their spirit.lo5
Read together then, Douglas' Griswold and Palmer opinions
characterize the ninth amendment as an enabling provision
which operates via analogies between legally unprecedented
and unenumerated rights and those rights already specified in
the Bill of Rights. If the asserted right is penumbral or analo-
gous to a specific right or group of rights already recognized
112Van Loan, supra note 2, at 48, citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
1,13 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
1;4 Id. at 233, 237 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1"15 Id. at 238, 239 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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as constitutional in stature, then Douglas believes the ninth
amendment enables, or perhaps requires, the Court to protect
the unenumerated right. Although this reasoning will often
depend upon an expansive reading of the Bill of Rights to
establish the necessary analogies, it is a far more conservative
notion than the idea that the ninth itself is a source of sub-
stantive rights. With this conservatism rests the true value of
the Douglas position, for if an asserted unenumerated right does
not reasonably relate to an enumerated right, the ninth amend-
ment does not enable the Court to recognize the new right. It
is by this mode of reasoning that the promise of Griswold can
be realized and yet the recognition of new rights may be doc-
trinally limited.
In contrast, the Goldberg position in Griswold is focused
on broad principles of liberty - a conceptualization which today
might permit Goldberg to use the ninth amendment to discover
a "basic freedom" even in the absence of a specific penumbral
relationship. In short, there are no clearly ascertainable limits
to unenumerated rights in the Goldberg scheme.
Mr. Justice Stewart's position has remained unchanged since
his dissent in Goldberg: necessarily, if a ninth amendment right
is asserted, it must be asserted in combination with the tenth
amendment. The "people" of the ninth amendment are -as
they were in Griswold - embodied by the state legislatures,
and thus the ninth may not be used by individuals against the
state; instead, it may be used only by the state in exercising its
legitimate police power. Stewart, reasoning from this posture
in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wad-
mond,1"'! labeled an individual claim of privacy asserted under
the first, fourth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments as one
which "borders on the frivolous," since the protection of private
personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily
to the individual states under the ninth and tenth amend-
ments.",- As was observed earlier,'- some lower federal courts
have followed this traditional view of the ninth amendment,
and whatever else may be said about such a view, it is clearly
one which needs no limitations regarding the recognition of
individual rights.
1,6 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
I17 Id. at 160. In fairness to Justice Stewart, the frivolity he sees may not
rest in the individual claim, but rather that the affiants were chosen by
the applicant himself.
See, e.g., text p. 169 supra.
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Of the three original positions articulated in Griswold,10 9
Stewart's has remained much the same; Goldberg's position,
although followed in some of the lower court opinions surveyed
earlier,1 0 is of questionable vitality because Goldberg is no
longer available to develop and defend his position, and because
his "liberty theory" cannot be adequately circumscribed. Finally
the Douglas position has been gradually refined to a potentially
workable approach to the ninth amendment. In more recent
decisions, however, Douglas has exceeded these refinements,
and in so doing he may have accomplished two results: first,
he may have somewhat muddied the waters of his enabling
theory and its use of penumbral relationships; and second, he
may have partially resurrected the Goldberg position. Analy-
sis of both these developments is critical to future use of the
ninth amendment.
In Osborn v. United States,"' Douglas cites Griswold and
all amendments listed therein except the fourteenth to support
a general right of privacy.1 2 Additionally, in dissenting from
denial of certiorari in Freeman v. Flake,1 3 Douglas suggests
that only one amendment is necessary to bring the ninth
into operation as a penumbral relator:
I can conceive of no more compelling reason to exercise our dis-
cretionary jurisdiction than a conflict of such magnitude, on an
issue of importance bearing on First Amendment and Ninth
Amendment rights.
1 14
Both these opinions are consistent with Douglas' enabling theory
of the amendment, but in another dissent from certiorari in a
student long hair case, Olff v. East Side Union High School
District, 5 Douglas reasons that "liberty . . . includes at least
109) Of the rest cf the Griswold court only Justices Brennan and White re-
main. Brennan, who joined in the Goldberg concurrence, has remained
consistent with his 1965 position. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 248 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice White, who con-
curred singly in Griswold without mentioningthe ninth amendment, has
offered one bit of dictum indicating his willingness to entertain the
Douglas or Goldberg-Brennan positions. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972), where he wrote the majority opinion, White found a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment where the state failed to provide an
unwed father with a hearing to determine his fitness as custodial par-
ent of his children. White cites Goldberg's Griswold concurrence favor-
ably: "The integrity of the family unit has found protection in . . .
the Ninth Amendment." Id. at 651. Of the members of the current
court appointed after the Griswold decision - Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Marshall -none are on
record with a post-Griswold opinion embracing the ninth amendment.
'"'See, e.g., text pp. 160-61 supra.
385 U.S. 323 (1966).
Il" Id. at 341.
113 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent from denial of certiorari).
114 Id.
11 404 U.S. 1042 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent from denial of certiorari).
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the fundamental rights 'retained by the people' under the Ninth
Amendment .... "116 The ambiguity here is similar to that in
Griswold: a largely undefined reference to the ninth amend-
ment. But Olff, like Freeman is a long hair case, which given
Douglas' pronouncements in similar cases, suggests that he
would join the first and ninth amendments to protect an unenu-
merated right of the student. If and when certiorari is granted
in such a case, it is to be expected that Douglas will resolve
any doubts in the enabling theory occasioned by his Olff
opinion.
The even more recent Douglas concurrence in the abortion
case of Roe v. Wade,117 demonstrates his belief that the ninth
amendment is not an independent source of substantive rights,
but rather that it is an enabler. The opinion also suggests that
Douglas sees more vitality in Goldberg's "liberty theory" than
one might expect, particularly as it applies to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment:
The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally en-
forceable rights, [he then quotes the ninth in full]. But a cata-
logue of these rights includes customary, traditional, and time-
honored rights, amenities, privileges, and immunities that come
within the sweep of "the Blessings of Liberty" mentioned in the
preamble to the Constitution. Many of them in my view come
within the meaning of the term "liberty" as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 118
An alternative interpretation of Douglas' opinion in Roe is that
he was much more concerned with affecting a conclusive resolu-
tion on the subject of abortion, than with furthering any given
doctrinal theory.
CONCLUSION
Had Griswold stood initially for more than a conglomerate
of varied holdings in search of a doctrinal base for the right
of marital privacy, many of the differing responses to ninth
amendment claims in the lower courts might have been
avoided. Patently, Griswold still offers no clear signal of its
meaning, either in retrospect or through any "line" of cases
that follows from it. Though Douglas has since refined and
elaborated on the enabling theory he introduced in Griswold,
further clarification of his position is now needed.
In view of the substantial split among the circuit courts
of appeals on the applicability of Griswold and the ninth
1"Id. at 1044. Douglas' use of "liberty principles" is reminiscent of the
Goldberg concurrence in Griswold.




amendment to the student rights long hair cases, and the
indecision over these cases at the district court level, the Court
might entertain a clarification of Griswold in this sphere. Also,
since the long hair cases seem to assert penumbral rights that
are akin to those protected in Griswold, an extension of
Griswold to these cases would be a cautious and moderate one.
Conversely, any holding limiting Griswold to its facts would
weaken the immediate potential of the ninth amendment.
Ultimately, the Court must decide the nature of those rights
retained by the people, but left unenumerated by the Consti-
tution. Implicit in our constitutional design of government is
the firm belief that the ultimate source of sovereign power is
the people-that they collectively sacrificed many individual
freedoms for the benefits of social order. In return, the power
they granted government was a power limited by the Consti-
tution, but as evidenced by the specific enumerations of the
Bill of Rights, many individual rights were not sacrificed in
this process. What the ninth amendment then reaffirms is
that there are rights older than the Constitution itself, which
were retained by the people-rights which may not be
"denied" or "disparaged" for their mere lack of enumeration in
the Bill of Rights.
Moreover, the ninth amendment may hold a potential
similar to that of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Under the Warren Court's theory of "new equal
protection," the burden rested with the state to establish a
compelling and legitimate state interest served by a challenged
statutory classification of individuals. Analogously, under the
ninth amendment, one who exercises a right he believes was
"retained" by the people and whose assertion is in some manner
suppressed by the state might conceivably employ the ninth to
shift the burden to the state. If the right he exercises is un-
enumerated and if he makes a prima facie case that it is a right
retained by the people, the state may not ignore this claimed
right with any argument that the right he identifies is not
specified in the Constitution. It will then be the state's burden
to establish either (1) that the right could not possibly be
retained by the people or, (2) if retained, that a compelling
state interest militates against the exercise of the right.
It is suggested here that the position of Mr. Justice Doug-
las. as developed in his opinions subsequent to Griswold is the
soundest view of the ninth amendment now available to Court.
The Douglas approach has appeal to those who wish to find
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unenumerated rights of substance in (or through) the ninth
amendment; it also contains -as has been discussed herein -
a safeguard for moderate constructionists, who, under the
Douglas approach, would demand that any novel, unenumerated
right be keyed specifically to enumerated rights by penumbra
or analogy.
The first bud of a constitutional law development similar
to the geometric expansion of equal protection and new equal
protection may have been seeded for the ninth amendment in
Griswold. But until the next needed clarifying step is taken
by the Court, this promise of Griswold cannot be realized.
